China In Eurasia

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

What The Wagner Rebellion Means For Xi

The dust is still settling on the weekend mutiny launched by Yevgeny Prigozhin and his private Wagner mercenary group that shook Russia and exposed new cracks in Russian President Vladimir Putin's power at home.

But what does it mean for China and its leader, Xi Jinping, who has been Moscow's -- and Putin's -- strongest supporter since the February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

Finding Perspective: As Wagner forces seized a major Russian military hub and ordered an armed march on Moscow on June 24, Chinese officials were silent. Chinese state media provided straight, factual coverage as events unfolded on the ground and, unsurprisingly, offered no sympathy for Prigozhin or Wagner, and instead largely echoed rhetoric from Putin's speech about the need for law, order, and stability.

It wasn't until Sunday, June 25 -- after the convoy to Moscow was turned around following a deal brokered by Belarusian ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka between Putin and Prigozhin -- that Beijing broke its silence.

"This is a matter of Russia's domestic affairs," the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement. "China supports Russia in safeguarding national stability and delivering development and prosperity."

That same day, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko flew to Beijing for what was said to be a scheduled meeting, where he met with Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang.

"Under the strategic guidance of President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin, the Chinese-Russian political trust has continued to deepen," Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu said following the meeting.

Why It Matters: Xi now has to balance continuing support for Putin with hedging for the possibility that the Russian leader's time in power could be cut short.

Xi's partnership with Putin is based on a cocktail of ideology and pragmatism, and several Chinese scholars have argued that Prighozin's rebellion could limit the pragmatic appeal of the Kremlin.

Yu Jianrong, a prominent Chinese public intellectual, posted a video to his more than 7 million Weibo followers of Russians in Rostov-on-Don reacting angrily to police moving into the city, where he suggested there was some level of public support for Wagner: "I really don't know what's going on in this country," he wrote.

Meanwhile, Yu Sui, a professor at the China Center for Contemporary World Studies, told the China Daily newspaper the mutiny "undoubtedly rings an alarm bell for Russia" and that the episode reminded him of "the Chinese saying about feeding a tiger and then inviting trouble."

Shen Dingli, a Shanghai-based international relations scholar, told the Guardian that he believed the events would lead to Russia's increased dependence on China and that Beijing would take "a more cautious stance on Russia."

As Minxin Pei, a professor at Claremont McKenna College, wrote in a recent piece for Bloomberg, the invasion and Putin's actions since have provided Xi with a steady stream of lessons "too precious not to learn" when it comes maintaining support of the military, the absence of private armies, and keeping less personalistic control of the state.

When it comes to Prigohzin's rebellion, Mei writes, it's "a reminder to Xi that nationalism is a double-edged sword."

Expert Corner: Taiwan's Prague Moment

Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu recently made his second visit to Prague, where he spoke at a conference and sat front row to watch a speech by Czech President Petr Pavel, marking the first time a Taiwanese minister and European head of state shared a room together.

You can read my full report here, but I've chosen some notable passages by both Wu and Pavel:

Wu on China and Russia: "What we are witnessing is that the two authoritarian forces are collaborating with each other, trading ever more with each other, and feeding more into the hunger for expansion."

Wu on Europe's role: "In order for Taiwan to stay strong and resilient and to have the courage to continue the policy of maintaining the status quo, we do need support from our European friends."

Pavel on how Europe should engage with China: "We should do it the same way that China does to us. Let's not create dependencies. Let's do business and let's cooperate when it is beneficial to both sides -- but let's keep in mind that China's long-term interests and values are not compatible with ours."

Do you have a question about China's growing footprint in Eurasia? Send it to me at StandishR@rferl.org or reply directly to this e-mail and I'll get it answered by leading experts and policymakers.

Three more stories from Eurasia

1. A Softer Line From Brussels?

The European Union Council summit is set to take place later this week and, according to a leaked draft of the post-summit statement obtained by RFE/RL, the council is still juggling how best to handle its complex economic and geopolitical relationship with China.

The Details: The leaked draft mostly focuses on economic measures, reaffirming the 27-country bloc's "multifaceted policy approach toward China" and that "despite their different political and economic systems, the European Union and China have a shared interest in pursuing constructive and stable relations."

The document seen by RFE/RL for the June 29-30 meetings says the EU will continue with its de-risking plans and keep diversifying away from dependencies on China in critical industries, but it clarified that Brussels "does not intend to decouple or to turn inward."

After apparently walking back some tougher past rhetoric on the economic front, the draft also appears to adopt stronger language on Taiwan.

While reaffirming the bloc's "One-China policy," it states: "The East and South China Seas are of strategic importance for regional and global prosperity and security. The European Union is concerned about growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The European Council opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion."

2. The Latest On Montenegro's Chinese-Built and Finances Highway

Montenegro will end a deal with Western banks that protected it from increased debt on a controversial Chinese loan for nearly $1 billion used to build a highway, my colleague Lela Scepanovic from RFE/RL's Balkan Service reports.

What You Need To Know: The move is the latest chapter in the saga of Montenegro's controversial highway -- which was built by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and financed by the Export-Import Bank of China with an immense loan -- and created long-term economic risk by saddling the country with debts to Beijing that once totaled more than a third of the state budget.

In exiting the deal that converted its dollar debt to the Chinese bank into euros, the country's finance ministry said on June 14 that it "earned approximately $64 million" after reverting to the recently strengthened dollar.

The ministry said it will use that money to help make its next debt payment to China in January.

3. The 11th Sanctions Package

The EU adopted its 11th sanctions package on June 23 and for the first time added companies registered in China to its list of entities aiding Russia's war in Ukraine, although it limited the number at the last minute.

What It Means: The new sanctions package looked to hit third parties from circumventing existing restrictions, especially products like semiconductors and radio equipment given their potential military applications.

The EU list added companies registered in China -- specifically, Hong Kong -- Uzbekistan, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, and Armenia.

Eight Chinese companies were named in a draft document seen by RFE/RL, but five were removed after the Chinese government made a commitment to put pressure on them, according to a Reuters report.

Their removal may have stemmed from a reluctance within the EU to avoid aggravating ties with Beijing.

Across The Supercontinent

Kazakh Crosshairs: Bekzat Maksutkhan, the head of Naghyz Atajurt, an unregistered advocacy group in Kazakhstan that works with families who have relatives missing in China's vast repression system in Xinjiang, says he was questioned and fined by Kazakh authorities on June 19, RFE/RL's Kazakh Service reports.

Kazakh authorities have moved to silence activism around the treatment of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang in recent years, and Maksutkhan is one of the few still working on the issue inside the country.

One More? Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk said in an interview that talks between the Eurasian Economic Union -- which comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia -- and Iran are in their final stages and could lead to a free trade agreement by the end of the year.

Chemical Central: According to leaked Hungarian government documents obtained by Direkt36, China is aiming to transport a significant part of its chemical production destined for Europe by rail to Hungary.

The plan, which is backed by the Hungarian government and in the later stages of negotiations, would look to supply Europe's battery factories and other industrial plants from Hungarian chemical trade hubs.

Middle Corridor: Kazakh Prime Minister Alikhan Smailov and his Georgian counterpart, Irakli Garibashvili, held new talks about increasing oil transit through Black Sea ports and building more infrastructure along the Middle Corridor that brings good to and from China and Europe, RFE/RL's Kazakh Service reports.

One Thing To Watch

Russia's war in Ukraine saw a flurry of sanctions unleashed on Moscow by the United States and its allies. But could the same be done for China after an invasion of Taiwan?

According to a new study by the Atlantic Council and Rhodium Group, the answer is yes in theory, but getting there may be too many obstacles to overcome.

Washington and its allies would face tough choices in deciding how far to go in pressuring Beijing, struggle to find unity among partners, and have to deal with a China that has more tools than Russia in being able to cushion the blow.

According to the study, sanctions against Chinese industry would likely be narrowly targeted at specific companies and industries where China is highly dependent on G7 countries but where the United States and its allies rely little on Chinese exports. One example mentioned is China's aerospace sector, which is heavily dependent on foreign-sourced engines and avionics.

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.

Welcome back to the China In Eurasia briefing, an RFE/RL newsletter tracking China's resurgent influence from Eastern Europe to Central Asia.

I'm RFE/RL correspondent Reid Standish and here's what I'm following right now.

How Chinese Parts Make It To The Battlefield In Ukraine

It's been a constant since Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but Chinese parts and components -- as well as drones and some weapons -- are finding their way onto the battlefield and helping Russia's military.

Finding Perspective: The issue was pushed back into the spotlight following a video posted to Telegram by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov showcasing an array of new military equipment, including eight Chinese-made unarmed armored personnel carriers.

The vehicles appeared to be a multipurpose model called the Tiger or China Tiger and the video brought renewed scrutiny of Chinese weaponry helping the Kremlin's war effort -- a possibility raised by Western governments and experts for some time.

It's difficult to determine when or how the Chinese vehicles ended up in Chechnya, or how they might be deployed on the battlefield -- if at all.

While the equipment is no doubt Chinese-made, multiple military experts I spoke with said it was unlikely this was from a formal sale, saying that the Tiger is widely exported around the world -- including across Africa and to Tajikistan -- and that Kadyrov states in the video that "we regularly purchase military equipment that helps our fighters be more effective in solving the tasks assigned to them."

Why It Matters: There is no evidence so far that China has provided any formal military aid, such as shipments of ammunition or full weapons systems.

Doing so would bring major reputational costs to Beijing and China has instead pivoted to taking up a diplomatic position around the war to frame itself as a peacemaker.

Still, Chinese exporters have supplied components of weapons systems and dual-use technology to sanctioned Russian defense companies.

A new report from The Wall Street Journal found that Iranian drones used by Russia in Ukraine had new Chinese parts that were made this year.

The revelation shows that new Chinese components are continuing to flow into Iran, where they then make their way to Russia. According to an investigation, the Chinese part was made in January, shipped to Iran, installed, and then sent to Russia and used against Ukraine in April.

While this stops short of full-blown military support, it highlights the complexities of supply chains and the multitude of ways countries can still skirt sanctions.

Another recent investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project tracked an export path for Chinese drones from China to Russia to the battlefield via the Netherlands and Kazakhstan through a collection of Russian-owned companies.

Expert Corner: Slovakia, Elections, And Taiwan

Readers asked: "Along with the Czech Republic, Slovakia has been one of Taiwan's strongest supporters in Europe. The country is set to hold parliamentary elections in late September amid rising populism and growing pro-Russian, anti-Ukraine rhetoric on the political spectrum. How might that affect relations with Taipei?"

To find out more, I asked Matej Simalcik, the executive director of the Central European Institute of Asian Studies in Bratislava:

"There's still time until the elections and the polling is not yet conclusive about what the result may be or what kind of constellation of parties can form a coalition. But at the moment, the election could go either way and that could impact relations with China and Taiwan, even though neither are big election topics in Slovakia.

"In general, you can divide Slovak politicians into three groups when it comes to China. The first are those that are pragmatically pro-Chinese and see it as a source of economic benefits. The second are more ideologically inclined towards China. These two groups are mixed and matched across several political parties, but share elements of their worldview when it comes to economics and politics that tends to favor Chinese interests. The third group are those that are opponents of China ideologically while calling for some form of limited trade relations.

"Should the opposition form a government [likely led by former Prime Minister Robert Fico's Smer-SD party] then we'd see the first two groups have a larger voice. It's also important to observe that many of these politicians that tend to be pro-Chinese are also pro-Russian and they don't back China out of sheer goodwill. It's generally a very cold political calculus where they can use China in a way that fits into their anti-West narratives related to domestic politics or the war in Ukraine."

Do you have a question about China's growing footprint in Eurasia? Send it to me at StandishR@rferl.org or reply directly to this e-mail and I'll get it answered by leading experts and policymakers.

Three More Stories From Eurasia

1. Georgia's Chinese-Built Highway

A nearly $1 billion megaproject looks to transform Georgia's timeless landscape, but the Chinese-built highway is also grappling with questions over how the contracts were awarded and unexplained delays, as I reported recently from the country.

What You Need To Know: The Chinese-built project was the focus of a recent reporting trip to Georgia and I drove along the construction with my colleague Tamuna Chkareuli, who also took some excellent photographs.

The project is ambitious, with the 51.6-kilometer section cutting through Georgia's mountainous countryside and consisting of 96 bridges and 53 tunnels.

Once completed, the highway will transform travel in Georgia, which lacks high-quality infrastructure, and potentially cut the journey from the capital, Tbilisi, to the Black Sea coast in half while providing a much-needed boost to the country's tourism-dependent economy.

But the project is also dealing with criticism and scrutiny over how the winning contracts were awarded to a constellation of Chinese firms and a series of unexplained delays that has seen costs rise and construction deadlines extended. Read more about it here.

2. Badiucao's Show Goes On in Poland

I obtained an e-mail that shows the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw trying to pressure the Polish government to cancel an upcoming art exhibit in the Polish capital by dissident artist Badiucao. Read the article here.

The Details: In the written exchange sent on June 7 to senior officials at the Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage from embassy staff, a Chinese diplomat says that the art show is an attack against the image of "China and Chinese leaders" and that it hurts "Chinese people's feelings."

The e-mail then goes on to say that the show being hosted in Poland could harm the "bilateral relationship" between Beijing and Warsaw and asks for a meeting with senior ministry staff.

It's not the first time this has happened. Similar incidents occurred during past shows in Italy in 2021 and the Czech Republic in 2022. Badiucao is famous for his provocative political art that tackles topics like repressions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, the Chinese Communist Party's response to the coronavirus pandemic, the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, and broadly criticizing Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Embassy officials have also visited the museum hosting the upcoming June 16 show and told them to shut it down.

3. Let's Get Virtual

This July's upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit will now be held virtually, amid speculation that Russian President Vladimir Putin's fear of foreign travel is the main reason for changing the meeting format.

What It Means: India is offering no official reason for the switch, but many observers see the move tied to Putin being reluctant to leave Russia since he was indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and an arrest warrant was issued.

India is not a member of the ICC, but Putin's presence would likely lead to increased scrutiny of New Delhi's long-standing ties with Moscow and added pressure from the West.

Indian media have also reported that New Delhi's rocky ties with China and Pakistan, which are both members of the SCO, are also a factor. Neither Beijing nor Islamabad had reportedly confirmed top-level attendance for an in-person meeting.

A similar dilemma is also facing South Africa as it gears up to host the BRICS summit -- which is made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa -- in August.

Unlike India, South Africa is a signatory to the ICC and the government is already facing pressure over its ties to Russia and is also now considering switching to a virtual format for the summit, according to Semafor.

Across The Supercontinent

Fake Docs, No Deal: A Chinese construction company, the Gezhouba Group, was disqualified from participating in a major infrastructure project in Bosnia-Herzegovina after it submitted false documents and incorrect information in its bid to build a key tunnel in the country's south, my colleague Melisa Teletovic reported from Sarajevo.

The Limits Of Kabul And Beijing: Despite the appearance that China and the Taliban are becoming allies, the relationship is still limited and largely transactional, my colleague Abubakar Siddique reports.

'Sponsors Of War': Ukraine has officially designated Hikvision and Dahua "international sponsors of war," alleging that they supply Russia with products that have military purposes such as drones, thermal imagers, and anti-drone guns, along with contributing to Russia's budget.

As Charles Rollet from IPVM explains, the designation is "reputational only" and has "no legal consequences," but it still sends a powerful message from Kyiv.

No Ban: Brussels is working on a review of the so-called security toolbox for 5G wireless networks, and according to Politico, the EU isn't actually planning a full-on ban against Chinese telecoms giant Huawei, but "may use the opportunity to push governments that haven't applied the 5G security principles to high-risk vendors to fall in line and impose restrictions."

One Thing To Watch

Don't call it a "thaw" just yet, but U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to visit Beijing on June 18.

This was originally supposed to happen earlier this year before the appearance of an apparent Chinese spy balloon led to Blinken canceling his trip to Beijing. The upcoming visit comes after several months of rising tensions between the two countries and both sides will need to overcome a mutual mistrust that has been allowed to build following a number of recent incidents.

That's all from me for now. Don't forget to send me any questions, comments, or tips that you might have.

Until next time,

Reid Standish

If you enjoyed this briefing and don't want to miss the next edition, subscribe here. It will be sent to your inbox every other Wednesday.